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Governance and Concerted
Regulation of Employment in Europe
ABSTRACT ■ This article analyses the changes and challenges involved in the
governance of employment in the EU-15 over the past decade. Several
interrelated changes are examined: the European Employment Strategy;
social pacts at national level; and bipartite bargaining covering employment
issues. One can argue that raising employment levels currently constitutes a
consensus-making factor at European level and within countries, but that
there is a progressive shift in the rules of the game: we are witnessing both
procedural and substantive changes in the governance of labour markets.
Introduction
Governing employment has become a key concern in Europe, after
years when high unemployment levels in most countries have been seen
as a major threat to social cohesion and to fragile pension systems. The
interconnected economic, political and social implications of unemploy-
ment and employment make these issues a key criterion of European
performance compared to the USA and Japan, and also a field in which
the construction of a social dimension is tested. The EU has a high
degree of labour market regulation (Dølvik, 2001; Esping-Andersen and
Regini, 2000), but numerous changes have affected this over the past
decade.
This article analyses changes in the governance of employment over the
past decade in the EU-15, examining three different levels at which rules
are negotiated: European, national and sub-national. It also considers
coordination between these various levels of regulation and questions the
nature of the rules defined. Four interrelated changes are examined: first,
the European Employment Strategy (EES), which has made little signifi-
cant impact on national industrial relations; second, social pacts negoti-
ated in many countries, with employment as one of their key dimensions;
third, bipartite bargaining which also covers employment issues, but is
rarely coordinated within national IR systems; and fourth, the broad
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consensus at European level on the need to raise employment levels, and
the consequential shift in labour market rules. The article draws on
official European sources; national reports on collective bargaining on
employment in the 15 member states produced for DG Employment and
Social Affairs; European social partners’ reports on involvement in the
2003 national action plans (NAPs) and in European guidelines; 13
national reports on social partner involvement in the 2003 NAPs; and
comparative reports on ‘pacts for employment and competitiveness’
published by the European Foundation.
Governance and the Concerted Regulation of
Employment
The notion of governance generally refers to a reconfiguration of the role
of the state, becoming less authoritative and less hierarchical in conduct-
ing economic, political and social change; the shift from government to
governance in processes of decision-making and policy implementation
involves other actors in multiple arenas, such as unions and employers’
organizations as well as regional and local authorities (Burroni, 2004; De
Ruyter, 2004; Lallement, 1999). Governance is ‘the set of mechanisms,
devices and institutional arrangements that coordinate the economic
actions of actors and organizations, regulate the distribution of resources
and structure conflicts’ (Burroni, 2004: 4); the term also refers to the
search in modern societies for new relationships between the market and
institutional regulation (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997).
The concept of governance is thus close to that of regulation as used
by Reynaud (1989) and later Lallement (1999) to analyse employment in
France and Germany and by Jobert (2000) to study the role of branches
and territories in industrial relations systems. It denotes the processes by
which social rules are produced and transformed, sometimes in the form
of prescriptions or restrictions, but more often as a guide for action or a
model that orients social actors’ behaviour. Regulation is the product of
social exchanges and is, consequently, the result of explicit or implicit
social compromises which define not only substantive rules on employ-
ment, but also the ‘rules of the game’, that is, the regulation process itself.
Regulation is highly contingent, depending on the problems to be solved
and the actors involved and also on pre-existing rules that act as both
resources and constraints.
Rules, however, are not rigid: they can be interpreted, forgotten,
rejected or reaffirmed by the actors, who do not spontaneously agree to
respect a single set of rules. Hence regulation does not consist of a
coherent system of articulated rules integrated within a hierarchical struc-
ture; in particular, the articulation between state regulation and collective
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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agreements is a complex system of partly concurrent and conflicting rules
(Reynaud, 2000).
The language of governance has appeared in the field of employment
with a normative flavour. The revised EES presented in 2003 after five
years of the ‘Luxembourg process’ emphasized ‘good governance and
partnership in the implementation of the employment guidelines’: there
was a double necessity to implement employment guidelines effectively
and to involve in the process parliamentary bodies, relevant actors at
national, regional and local levels, and the social partners (European
Council, 2003; EC, 2004a).
Governance of employment in Europe today raises two interconnected
issues for industrial relations: the first is the participation of social
partners in the regulation of employment, which in turn raises the
question of the concerted character of policies to increase employment
rates; the second is the respective roles of the state and social partners,
and particularly the relationships between government employment
policies and collectively bargained rules. Applying Reynaud’s perspec-
tive, employment regulation cannot be conceptualized as the simple
pyramidal implementation of coherent rules from European to national
and, finally, to sub-national sets of rules. The relationships between
various rule-setting arenas become a problem of coordination, on the one
hand, between state-led initiatives and collective bargaining, and on the
other, among the different levels of industrial relations.
Procedural Changes
Concerted Regulation of Employment Under the EES
At European level, the major innovation over the past decade consists in
the EES. Its fundamental characteristics have remained the same since its
launch in 1997, despite its revision in 2003 (Foden and Magnusson, 2003;
De la Porte and Pochet, 2003, 2004; Watt, 2004): annual guidelines must
be translated into NAPs, which are then evaluated by the Commission
and result in recommendations to each member state. Nor has the content
of the guidelines themselves changed fundamentally, despite alteration in
their form (Watt, 2004).
The notion of ‘good governance’ in the EES includes insistence on the
participation of unions and employers’ organizations in the preparation
and implementation of NAPs. This was reaffirmed in the 2003 revised
version: ‘the effective implementation of the employment guidelines
requires active participation of social partners, at all stages, from design-
ing policies to their implementation’ (European Council, 2003: 16). How
far has this injunction been observed? Data are piecemeal, with little
Léonard: Governance and Concerted Regulation of Employment
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systematic and fully comparable information. Table 1 summarizes
conclusions from three different sources evaluating social partner partici-
pation in the 2003 NAPs (EC, 2004a; ETUC et al., 2004; Eironline, 2003).
The evidence is that the EES gives a clear impetus to consultation on
NAPs, yet real concertation is rare. In the evaluation of the 2003 exercise,
even the Commission recognized that NAPs are not a central tool for the
governance of national employment policies and that governments
remain the major and almost only actor in the process (EC, 2004a). The
European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) report by Baradel
and Welz (2005) on social partner involvement in the 2002/03 NAPs
generally confirms this, and a longer-term evaluation of the EES reaches
a similar conclusion (De la Porte and Pochet, 2003, 2004).
There are many obstacles to more active participation in the NAP
process. First, the annual exercise does not allow enough time for effec-
tive concerted action. Moreover, in some countries the timetable does not
coincide with the annual wage bargaining round, inhibiting coordination.
Second, the complexity of the subjects covered (for example, adaptabil-
ity of the labour market, ‘lifelong learning’, ‘active ageing’ and active
labour market policies) compounds the difficulties of participation
within a tight calendar. These are, moreover, issues on which the appro-
priate level of regulation, and the division of responsibilities between
government and social partners, can be particularly unclear. Third, some
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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TABLE 1. Social Partner Involvement in the 2003 National Action Plans
Country EC (2004a) Social partners Eironline (2003)
ETUC et al. (2004)
Austria ++ +– +–
Belgium ++ + +
Germany + +– +
Denmark ++ + +
Spain +– +– +–
Finland ++ +– +
France + no data +
Greece +– increasing + –
Ireland +– +– +
Italy – +– –
Luxembourg ++ +– no report
Netherlands ++ +– +–
Portugal – +– no report
Sweden ++ + +–
United Kingdom +– increasing +– +–
Note: ++ substantial participation; + some participation; +– consultation but little
impact; – little or no involvement.
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governments do not support social partner participation, or more
precisely union participation, even if they formally accept the principles
of the EES, as is currently the case in Austria and Italy. Lastly, in some
cases no consensus can be found among unions themselves, as in France,
or between unions and employers and the government, leading to an
incapacity to adopt joint positions on the NAP. The short time-frame
again increases the difficulty.
Concertation Attempts and Social Pacts
While social partner involvement in NAPs has been weak, in many
countries tripartite bargaining has taken place for the conclusion of social
pacts. The literature (in particular, Pochet, 1998; Pochet and Fajertag,
1997, 2000; Rhodes, 2003) mainly attempts to explain this trend by
arguing that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) created pressures
for national governments and social partners to agree on wage restraint
in order to control inflation rates and meet the Maastricht convergence
criteria. Certainly, the emergence or revival of social pacts tended to
coincide with the implementation of EMU, but this explanation is in-
adequate.
First, it tends to interpret such pacts as purely reactive responses to
exogenous constraints: EMU is seen as generating similar reactions in
very different national IR contexts. This is to ignore the endogenous
dynamics which have resulted in contrasting responses in different
countries, related in turn to the fact that unions and employers’ organiz-
ations constitute in the different countries different actors with various
ideologies and action capacities. Second, such an approach tends to
assume that national governments play a leading role, because of their
obligation to comply with the Maastricht criteria. This does not explain
the motivation of other actors: in particular, why unions should partici-
pate in pacts designed exclusively to restrain wage increases. Third, refer-
ence to EMU highlights macro-economic factors, but leaves aside the
social dimension. Pochet and Fajertag (2000) show that the pacts also
cover labour market flexibility and social security; they also claim that
the pacts of the late 1990s were more comprehensive than those earlier in
the decade, including both quantitative and qualitative measures and
extending beyond mere wage discipline. Lastly, the emphasis on EMU
has some difficulty in explaining why countries such as Denmark,
Sweden and Norway have concluded social pacts; and conversely, why
some countries in the eurozone have not.
Accordingly, EMU is certainly part of the story, but not the whole
story, for social pacts are also a means to reform the labour market. Data
on this dimension are again not systematic. Table 2 provides a general
overview of major actions in the employment field undertaken by
Léonard: Governance and Concerted Regulation of Employment
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TABLE 2. Social Pacts and Tripartite Arrangements on Employment, 1998–2003
Country 1998 2001 2003
Austria Social partner participation in Declining participation Tensions
policy-making
Belgium Bipartite central agreement Bipartite central agreement National tripartite conference
Germany Tripartite Bündnis für Arbeit Discussion within Bündnis Breakdown of Bündnis
established
Denmark Major tripartite agreements Coordinated government Tripartite dialogue
initiatives and collective bargaining
Spain Bargaining subject to 1997 National bipartite and tripartite Difficulties
interconfederal agreements agreements
Finland Application of central incomes- Central incomes policy agreement Central incomes policy agreement
policy agreement (December 2000) (December 2002)
France None Tensions Parallel discussions in committee
for European and international
issues
Greece None Tensions National employment committee
Ireland Tripartite pact ‘Partnership 2000’ Tripartite pact ‘Prosperity and Tripartite pact ‘Sustaining Progress’
in force Fairness’ in force in force
Italy Tripartite social pact Growth of ‘negotiated flexibility’ Bipartite pact; but concertation
under pressure
Luxembourg Tripartite coordination committee Extension of role of committee Concertation
Netherlands Bargaining at national level Much consultation Bipartite StAr and tripartite SER
Portugal Bipartite joint declaration 2000 tripartite agreement in force Draft social contract
Sweden Tripartite talks on skills and Development of new institutional High degree of social dialogue
qualifications; bipartite talks on framework
sustainable growth and labour
market
United Kingdom Possibilities limited by a highly decentralized bargaining system and absence of links between the national
and micro levels. No comprehensive social partnership agreements.
Source: For 1998, Spineux et al. (1999); for 2001, Spineux et al. (2002); for 2003, Eironline (2003).
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governments, unions and employers’ associations; this gives by no means
an exhaustive account of concerted action, but is enough to demonstrate
the vitality and innovatory character of such attempts to reorganize
labour markets. Data are presented for three different years: 1998 (which
was also the first year of NAPs), 2001 and 2003. Additional information
is provided by the European social partners’ report for 2003 on ‘actions
in member states to implement employment guidelines’ (ETUC et al.,
2004). Bilateral and tripartite initiatives ‘aimed at supporting employment
and economic development through a comprehensive set of measures’ are
reported in Belgium, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain;
while in Ireland the 2003–05 partnership agreement ‘Sustaining Progress’
included the objective of ‘economic inclusion based on full employment’.
It is clear that numerous attempts have been made to conclude national
social pacts, leading to effective arrangements in seven countries:
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Sweden. In other countries, attempts have either failed or faced diffi-
culties: in France, discussions within bipartite groups and committees are
not articulated with governmental initiatives; in Germany, the ambitious
‘Alliance for jobs’ broke down in February 2003; in Austria, Italy and
Spain, concertation is under pressure mainly from the government. Inno-
vative, but uncertain attempts have been undertaken in countries such as
Portugal and Greece. The UK is the only country where there is no sign
of systematic and concrete attempts to conclude a social pact.
As noted above, EMU has certainly influenced social pacts, at least in
their wage moderation component, but this hardly explains the other
labour market policies included. One can interpret this as a form of
political exchange: while EMU provides incentives for wage restraint, the
inclusion of other labour market targets such as job creation, flexibility,
training and the integration of younger and older workers may facilitate
agreements that meet the interests of all actors and not only state macro-
economic discipline.
However, these pacts cannot be directly attributed to the influence of
the EES either, which has a limited influence on the NAPs themselves.
Again, the diversity of national experience indicates that a common
external stimulus has only limited explanatory power: the successful
negotiation of social pacts and other tripartite agreements also requires
strong stimuli or facilitating factors specific to the national context.
Across all EU-15 countries there is broad consensus on the need to
increase employment, and in many cases to decrease unemployment, but
the high degree of legitimacy assigned to this objective is capable in only
some countries of resulting in an agreement which reconciles the various
interests of unions, employers and the state.
The multidimensional content which is one of the distinctive features
of social pacts can itself facilitate the conclusion of such tripartite
Léonard: Governance and Concerted Regulation of Employment
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arrangements. Typically, these comprise a ‘package’ of measures: accord-
ing to Pochet and Fajertag (2000), they combine provisions for wage
restraint, labour market flexibility, social security and other policy issues
varying from one country to another. Similarly, research conducted in the
second part of the 1990s on ‘pacts for employment and competitiveness’
(PECs) concluded that such pacts, whether tripartite at national level or
bipartite at lower levels, reflect a wide agenda, including issues on work
redistribution, cost cutting, productivity and adaptability or employ-
ability (Freyssinet and Seifert, 1999; Sisson, 2000).
Rhodes (2001, 2003) argues that social pacts are the formal expression
of concerted attempts to reform labour markets and social security while
stimulating competitiveness in a macro-economic context in which
governments cannot apply the traditional instruments of national
economic policy. Considering four national cases, he concludes that
collaboration on incomes policy is secured by enabling union partici-
pation in social policy and labour market reform, while social pacts also
include rules on industrial relations and socio-economic governance.
Again, the true multidimensional character of social pacts cannot be
understood as the mere application of wage restraint imperatives; they
cover distributional and productivity issues and reflect attempts on the
part of national actors to reform labour markets. In other words, they
result from the search for concerted solutions able to meet the various
actors’ interests.
Social pacts thus involve complex arrangements combining wages,
competitiveness and employment. They require the institutional capacity
to negotiate across policy arenas and are thus innovative and fragile: as
various failed attempts indicate, their stability and viability are not guar-
anteed (Regini, 1999; Rhodes, 2003). Many difficulties or obstacles can
prevent the conclusion of such pacts. A change in governmental attitude
towards concertation is enough to destabilize the existing processes; diffi-
culty in reaching a consensus can lead to failure; beyond the general
objective in terms of employment, specific issues can be very contentious
(for instance, flexibility or ‘activation’ policies or retirement regimes) and
this can result in an incapacity to conclude an agreement satisfying all the
players.
In sum, social pacts may be influenced by EMU to the extent that the
Maastricht criteria provide incentives for wage restraint, but they also
include other dimensions, in particular measures to improve employment
levels. These can facilitate compromises on wage restraint, but in addition
they result from the willingness of national actors to reform labour
markets in order to increase employment. The latter consensual objec-
tive opens the road for multiple actions in the fields of flexibility,
work organization, working time, training and integration of younger
and older workers. The possibility of concluding multidimensional
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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agreements, within ‘integrative bargaining’ processes, certainly facilitates
agreement; but the process remains highly contingent, requiring govern-
mental support and depending on actors’ willingness and capacity to
make complex trade-offs.
Bargaining on Employment and the Coordination of Labour
Market Reform
Employment-related topics also feature in bipartite collective bargaining
at national level, though its extent is impossible to assess precisely
because of the lack of representative data on the detailed content of
collective agreements. However, several parallel research programmes
indicate that employment gained in importance in collective bargaining
during the 1990s. Research conducted for the European Foundation
shows that ‘pacts on employment and competitiveness’ constitute an
innovative approach to bargaining and are negotiated at branch and local
level in all 11 countries studied (Freyssinet and Seifert, 1999; Sisson,
2000). Bélanger and Thuderoz (1998) compare company bargaining in
France and Québec and suggest that employment, rather than wages, has
increasingly become a new ‘general equivalent’. Spineux et al. (1999, 2000,
2001, 2002) observe numerous processes of bargaining on employment in
the EU-15, at company, sectoral and national levels. Lastly, the 2004
European social partners’ reports on the implementation of the employ-
ment guidelines identify a large number of such initiatives.
Of course, there can be a bias here, since the notion of employment
covers a variety of measures, including training, flexibility and worker
mobility: it may be incautious to conclude that employment constitutes
a central issue in bargaining simply because themes such as flexibility or
training are included. Nevertheless, all the research cited shows that
collective bargaining contributes to labour market reform in European
countries. This role involves specific types of comprehensive, multidi-
mensional agreements resulting from integrative rather than distributive
bargaining (Sisson et al., 1999; Sisson, 2000). It also accompanies changes
in industrial relations systems. According to Sisson (2000), pacts on
employment and competitiveness encourage decentralization, ‘with a
wider participation of managers and employee representatives in the
framework of a serious partnership approach’.
The trend towards decentralization has been observed in most
European countries, but as Traxler (1995) has shown, this does not
necessarily mean a decline in higher levels of bargaining, which may
maintain a role in defining guidelines, rules and norms governing
company-level bargaining within a system of ‘organized decentraliza-
tion’. The degree of coordination among various arenas of bargaining is
indeed a central issue for the governance of employment. It has a direct
Léonard: Governance and Concerted Regulation of Employment
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impact on the coherence between the content of centrally concerted
employment policies or ‘social pacts’ and decision-making at company
level. A coordinated industrial relations system will favour such a coher-
ence, while an uncoordinated system will leave room for diverse and
uncontrolled employment practices within companies in the context of
what Traxler calls ‘disorganized decentralization’. In other words, in such
a case a social pact can have little effect in practice as long as companies
define their own employment practices, with or without bargaining.
In countries where social pacts have been concluded, a high degree of
coordination will favour coherence not only among different levels of
bargaining, from company to sector to cross-sector bargaining, but also
some synchronization between the state and industrial relations actors.
Where there is no social pact, a high degree of coordination will favour
coherence across sectors and across levels, but not with the state. Conse-
quently, as Crouch (2000), Traxler (1995, 2003) and Regini (2003) demon-
strate, though from different starting points, identifying the levels at
which bargaining is conducted is not enough to determine what type of
role industrial relations institutions play in the regulation of the labour
market. Coordination is a key criterion if we want to understand to what
extent labour market reform is conducted in a concerted way across levels
and sectors or, on the contrary, left to increasingly decentralized action.
In the context of national industrial relations systems, the combination
of social pact processes with different degrees of coordination gives rise
to four ideal-type scenarios. In the first, social partners and the state
conclude one or several social pacts, and there is a high degree of co-
ordination. This is, for instance, the case in Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, yet with different coordination mech-
anisms. Accordingly, in these countries a relatively coordinated reform
of the labour market is in progress, conducted through peak-level
concerted action that is coordinated with the various levels of bipartite
bargaining. This can be interpreted as the optimistic path of concerted
change from an industrial relations point of view, not only because social
partners participate in employment policies, but also because there is an
organized system that leads to coherent action ‘down to’ company level.
Some of these countries have indeed succeeded in conducting major
labour market reforms in a concerted way, as is clear in the often-cited
cases of Denmark and the Netherlands.
The opposite scenario involves a weakly coordinated industrial
relations system with no general agreement or arrangement between the
state, unions and employers’ associations. Here the classic example is the
UK, where there are no comprehensive social partnership agreements
(Hall, 2003) and industrial relations involve a high degree of decentral-
ization. In terms of labour market governance, such a scenario contains
a high risk of differentiation and fragmentation of the workforce, with
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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conditions varying from one company to another, along with the possi-
bility for individual companies to use a wider range of employment
measures, for example, utilizing a variety of ‘flexible contracts’ (De
Nanteuil-Miribel et al., 2004).
Between these two extremes, there are situations in which no social
pact has been negotiated, yet industrial relations have a high degree of
coordination. France is an example, with regular confrontations between
unions, employers’ associations and the government. Lastly, there is a
fourth scenario in which social pacts are concluded, but with a weak
degree of coordination of collective bargaining; hence the coherence of
nationally set up rules and what is negotiated and practised within
companies is not guaranteed. Greece would represent such a scenario if
the newly established employment committee reaches joint commit-
ments: the coherence between such arrangements and bargaining at lower
levels will remain uncertain if the current industrial relations system
remains unchanged.
Such ideal types must be applied flexibly, because the situation in each
country is not static: social pacts involve a high degree of contingency.
Hence different countries can follow different trajectories: in Portugal,
coordination and the pursuit of concertation are both increasing; in
Austria, the long-established tripartite social dialogue is at risk because
of the confrontation between the government and the social partners; in
Ireland, the conclusion of national partnership agreements seems to have
become more difficult because of growing disagreement over wage issues
and changes in the labour market (Dobbins, 2004).
‘More and Better Jobs for All’? Redesigning Labour
Markets for Full Employment
From Labour to Employment, then to Full Employment
In arenas at all levels, from the EES to company bargaining, the term
‘employment’ is widely present: in the ‘European strategy for employ-
ment’ and its impulse towards ‘national action plans for employment’, in
pacts and conferences ‘for employment’, in agreements ‘on employment
and competitiveness’, and so on.
The notion of employment as such is less common in the social sciences
than concepts such as labour and work. Its presence in the discourse of
actors such as the European Commission and Council, European social
partners and national governments, unions and employers’ organizations
reflects a general reference to the goal of full employment and this, in
turn, covers a progressive shift in substantive terms in the governance of
labour markets in Europe.
Léonard: Governance and Concerted Regulation of Employment
317
04_leonard_057213 (jk-t)  29/9/05  2:43 pm  Page 317
References to employment generally encompass both a numerical
dimension (the number of jobs or employment rates) and a qualitative
dimension (involving worker mobility, the flexibility or adaptability of
workers and companies and integration of specific categories of workers).
We can identify three interrelated variables: volume, that is, the number
of jobs within a national labour market or segments of this market
(women, school-leavers, older workers and ethnic minorities); structure,
that is, the distribution of qualifications and occupational status, nature
and distribution of contracts, and organization of working time; and
flows, which covers issues such as access to work, retirement and occu-
pational mobility (Maruani, 1990; Michon, 1994).
Pacts and agreements on employment commonly include a complex set
of measures, as follows:
• The EES encourages member states to implement policies according
to 10 guidelines that cover active measures for the unemployed, job
creation and entrepreneurship, adaptability and mobility in the labour
market, development of human capital and lifelong learning, active
ageing, gender equality, integration of disadvantaged people, ‘making
work pay’ through incentives to enhance work attractiveness, trans-
formation of undeclared work into regular employment and, lastly,
tackling regional disparities
• In national PECs, Sisson et al. (1999) identify measures for work
redistribution, cost cutting, productivity and adaptability, and employ-
ability, all more often designed for the purpose of preserving than
creating employment (Freyssinet and Seifert, 1999; Sisson, 2000) and
• Spineux et al. (1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002) also identify numerous pacts
and agreements associating training, functional and numerical flexibil-
ity, working time, cost cutting, measures for younger or older workers
and so on.
The overall preoccupation is to preserve or increase employment,
whether at company level, in a region or territory, in a national labour
market or finally, across Europe as a whole.
Full Employment under the EES
Increasing employment levels has become a widespread objective, but
also a more and more explicit goal in Europe over the past 10 years. It is
in fact a rather traditional objective, prevalent in Europe since the rise of
unemployment from the mid-1970s. Gobin (2000) reminds us that
employment was at the core of projects of tripartite concertation at
European level between 1969 and 1978 and that, in the same period, a
major European Trade Union Confederation demand was to make full
employment a political priority for Europe. In the 1980s and 1990s,
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)
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employment rates remained steadily below Japan’s and the USA’s, and
persistent high unemployment was considered a European disease,
causing social and economic problems (EC, 2003). This led to the 1993
Delors White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment and
subsequently to the EES. The Lisbon strategy, established in 2000, makes
full employment one of its three overarching objectives, and specifies
quantitative targets: an average EU employment rate of 67 percent by
2005 and 70 percent by 2010; an employment rate for women of 57
percent by 2005 and 60 percent by 2010; and an employment rate for
older workers (aged 55–64) of 50 percent by 2010.
The EES, often considered a key example of the social dimension of
European integration, has attracted much comment (Foden and Magnus-
son, 2003; De la Porte and Pochet, 2004; Pochet and Degryse, 2003; Watt,
2004), including criticism of its weak articulation with macro-economic
policy. However, a dimension of the strategy, although central to its new
version, is more rarely discussed, and this is the feasibility and the legiti-
macy of the full-employment objective as such.
Unemployment rates are now at very different levels in the various EU-
15 countries (and even more disparate across the EU-25), ranging from less
than 5 percent in Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands to 10 percent or more in Greece and Spain. The EU-wide priority
has therefore shifted from combating unemployment to increasing overall
employment levels and the specific rates for women and older workers.
Most countries are still falling short of the Lisbon targets, in particular in
respect of older workers (EC, 2004a). Accordingly, as Foden and Magnus-
son (2003) note, the priorities of the EES since its revision in 2003 have
shifted from lower unemployment to higher employment (a change in
emphasis in part reflecting concerns for the viability of pension systems).
Considering that the overall employment rate in Europe has remained
below 65 percent since the mid-1970s (EC, 2003), one may question
whether the 70 percent target is realistic, especially when labour market
trends have resulted in a failure to reach the intermediate targets for 2005
(EC, 2004a, 2004b). Moreover, enlargement in 2004 has made the situation
worse, as the 10 new members have an average employment rate of only
55.9 percent and an average unemployment rate of 14.8 percent (EC, 2003).
If full employment is a long-established and apparently endless quest,
it is today different from what it was at the end of the 1970s and early
1980s. In the EES, it is detailed in a number of quantitative indicators for
each of the guidelines, but is also associated with features characterizing
transformed labour markets:
• Strong insistence on ‘active policies’, that is, increased assistance to the
unemployed to help them find a job, but also on ‘incentives to enhance
work attractiveness’ and ‘make work pay’;
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• The importance of notions such as adaptability, worker mobility,
lifelong learning, underpinned by the idea of employability (while
‘employability’ is not precisely defined in the guidelines, the report of
the Employment Taskforce in November 2003 indirectly gave a defi-
nition when discussing the topic of flexibility, stating that workers’
security depends on their own capacity to remain and progress in the
labour market (Kok, 2003));
• Promotion of ‘active ageing’, to increase the participation of older
workers;
• Encouragement to women’s participation through notions such as
‘gender equality’ and ‘gender mainstreaming’ and;
• Pressure to reduce undeclared work and regional disparities, though
with no quantitative targets.
In sum, even if the insistence on partnership and on the participation
of social partners in the design and implementation of the employment
guidelines reflects an underlying neo-corporatist type of governance, the
overall picture is one of a labour market in which each individual should
actively search for a job, be ‘employable’, be mobile and adaptable,
improve his or her competencies over the whole of his or her career and
retire later than now.
This shift does not constitute a general deregulation of employment
relations. As Dickens (2003) and Dølvik (2001) have shown, most jobs in
Europe remain full time and with long-term contracts. Further, labour
market transformations are, at least partly, conducted by rules set up by
governments and the social partners. The shift, then, is rather in the
progressive and distinct erosion of the notion of job security, and the
growing affirmation of that of employability. This concept, as indicated
above, clearly puts the responsibility for employment on individuals
rather than on economic policies or employer strategies. Associated with
the insistence on active labour market policies, on the dependence of
social protection on occupation, this represents a subtle modification in
the position of workers: their rights are more and more conditioned by
their own ability to find a job. Instead of a right to work, there is a
growing obligation to be ‘employable’, associated with a shift from a
welfare to a ‘workfare’ state (Tromp and Beukema, 2001). In other words,
the ideology of full employment threatens to move towards a notion of
‘employment-based citizenship’, marked by a stress on supply-side
labour market policies rather than protection. Access to social security
becomes conditioned by the individual development of capacities useful
to the market, with the necessity of regular updates for the ‘knowledge-
based society’.
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The Pursuit of Consensus
Increasing the volume of employment is not only central to the EES, it
represents a consensual objective within individual countries, for several
reasons. First, in many countries, unemployment is a long-term and
structural problem to which successive programmes hardly provide an
answer. Even if average unemployment rates have tended to decrease over
the past 10 years, areas of high unemployment remain in specific regions,
and younger people are particularly hard hit, with an unemployment rate
over 15 percent across the EU-15 (EC, 2003).
Second, unemployment, or more generally the level of employment,
poses challenges of an economic, social and political nature. In economic
terms, it has a direct impact on social security costs and, as a consequence,
on labour costs and on public expenditures, while older workers’ partici-
pation is a key variable for the viability of pension regimes. In social
terms, it is related to individual social status and recognition and to the
collective challenge of the integration of young people and minorities as
well as to inequalities and social exclusion or cohesion. All these factors
have a political dimension, and additionally, state capacity to design and
implement efficient employment policies is a key electoral challenge
(Hamann and Kelly, 2003). Increasing employment thus represents a
societal challenge that directly concerns governments, employers and
workers and can therefore be considered as an objective conducive to
consensus making. It is, moreover, likely to meet the interests of each of
the players, favouring the conclusion of ambitious agreements and social
pacts. In other words, employers, unions and the state can gain from
compromises on employment. Over and above a potential reduction in
labour costs, employers can argue successfully for increased adaptability
in order to preserve competitiveness, gaining state and union support for
the development of a flexible and qualified workforce; unions see an
increase in the number of jobs not only as a question of solidarity, but
also of the social integration of more vulnerable sections of the popu-
lation, and a crucial condition for the survival of social security; for the
state, it means stability and security through social cohesion, a better
capacity to contain public expenditure and social security regimes, along
with a means to intervene in a field that is highly sensitive in electoral
terms.
Lastly, in a context in which variations in wages are strongly
constrained by EMU, actors willing to conduct labour market reform,
whether to improve competitiveness or to maintain social cohesion, need
to play on other levers: flexibility of contracts and working time, qualifi-
cations and skills, worker mobility and age of entry in to and exit from
work, that is, employment volume, structure and flows.
Therefore, both exogenous and endogenous factors contribute to the
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vitality of bargaining and concertation on employment: encouragement
from EMU and the EES; problems that are country specific, but are
present in all the countries; the notion of full employment as a consen-
sus-making facilitator; and the field for compromise between the various
interests at play.
However, the actual impact on employment rates remains uncertain
because many variables intervene. As Sisson (2000) notes, PECs are not
deemed a sufficient condition for growth and job creation; they consti-
tute what Saglio (1994) calls a ‘game of chance’, an exchange between
partners in which uncertainty of the final result remains important. The
actual impact in increasing the number of jobs is uncertain, but changes
in terms of flexibility, training, employability, and activation policies are
effective. In sum, all this contributes to a reform of labour markets for
the sake of full employment, in which the latter objective looks like an
endless quest for the holy grail, while the content of change in terms of
employment structure and flows is real.
Conclusion
Governance of employment in Europe has been marked by a series of
transformations over the past decade, including changes in both the
processes and the content of rules regulating the labour market: in
processual terms, progressive affirmation of the EES, development of
consultation within NAPs, social pacts or attempts to conclude them and
bipartite bargaining on employment; in substantive terms, the notion of
employability seems to be a widespread focus of policy and goes along
with the progressive adaptation of the labour market and of employment
conditions for the sake of full employment.
Institutions play an important role in conducting labour market
change, with numerous processes designed to develop joint solutions at
different levels: European, national and infra-national. Clearly, insti-
tutional actors do not intervene just to compensate for the excess of liber-
alization of the labour market, nor to maintain existing ‘rigidities’; they
aim to adapt labour markets with such objectives as ‘negotiated flexibil-
ity’ (Alacevich and Burroni, 2002).
The quest for full employment is widespread and favours consensus
building at both European level and within countries, while there are
European processes (EMU and EES) that constitute common constraints
for national actors. However, national scenarios vary because national
actors have to respond to labour market problems that are specific to
their own country: improving employment security in Spain, reducing
employment gaps in the Netherlands, implementing working-time
reduction in France and so on. Countries also differ on two other
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dimensions: the capacity to conclude social pacts and the degree of co-
ordination within their industrial relations systems.
Changing labour markets, evolving European frameworks and the
instability of social pacts: the most common characteristic of national
situations today is certainly that they are in flux. Innovative arrangements
such as PECs remain contingent on several conditions: government atti-
tudes towards unions and employers’ associations and towards concerta-
tion; conversely, the willingness of the latter to cooperate with the state
in the regulation of labour markets; their capacity to reach consensus and
to conclude complex multidimensional agreements that meet each other’s
interests; and the institutional capacity to implement arrangements at the
various levels and in different sectors, which is related to the degree of
coordination of industrial relations systems.
Accordingly, several future scenarios are possible:
• Consolidation of neo-corporatist change will occur in countries where
a number of conditions are met: the persistence of governmental
support, long-lasting compromises, actors with both the willingness
and capacity to conclude multidimensional agreements and insti-
tutional integration of arrangements into a coordinated industrial
relations system.
• Tensions among national actors or across levels of industrial relations
in the absence of governmental support, the failure of successive
attempts to conclude pacts and a lack of coherence between centrally
negotiated arrangements and sector and company-level practices.
• Breakdown, where the government’s attitude constitutes an obstacle
to concertation, where attempts to negotiate pacts never succeed or are
never undertaken, where conflicts over specific issues such as wages
or flexibility impede the conclusion of agreements and where lack of
coherence among levels or arenas results in increased workforce frag-
mentation that in turn makes common solutions more and more diffi-
cult to achieve — this latter scenario would favour employer-led
change, with liberalization of the labour market and weak union influ-
ence on the process.
Lastly, if full employment generally represents a consensus-building
goal, favourable to concertation and to trends towards the first scenario,
in the current context it also involves some ambiguity: it is conducive to
innovative types of agreements, supporting neo-corporatist change of
labour markets, but also involving greater flexibility, a shift in responsi-
bility for employment to the individual worker and employment-related
social protection, while no concrete impact in terms of the number of
jobs is guaranteed.
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